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Women with  Jus Post Bellum Analysis 
 Fionnuala Ní  Aoláin and  Dina  Haynes * 
 I.  Introduction 
 Over the past quarter-century, many countries have experienced deeply divisive and 
highly destructive con" icts, a number of which have then been subject to international 
intervention and ensuing post-con" ict reconstruction initiatives. Most of these inter-
national ventures have an in-country presence from the pre-negotiation phase through 
to the post peace agreement phase, and o# en into a development phase, resulting in de 
facto expansions of international administration in the period a# er con" ict’s formal 
conclusion. 1 
 While societies rarely have the opportunity to revisit and remake their basic social, 
political, and legal compacts, countries emerging from con" ict provide multiple 
opportunities for transformation on many di% erent levels, opportunities uncommon 
in stable and non-transitional societies. Such potentially transformative moments are 
so infrequent that their occurrence helps explain our preoccupation with societies that 
have been deeply and cyclically violent. 2 It also explains why some feminists view tran-
sitional opportunities as particularly important to groups that have been marginalized, 
underrepresented, and discriminated against, even while others are more reserved, 
wary of the vision of empire that submerges “international con" ict feminism” into a 
broader imperialist project in sites of post-con" ict nation building, and caution against 
over-optimism. 3 Among the many risks for women, there is the ever-present danger that 
the transformation from “con" icted” to “peaceful” risks being partial and exclusionary 
with the transition process itself operating to cloak women’s ongoing repression and 
inequality. Because of the transformative potential in this moment—for women in 
particular and for gender relations more generally—and given the critical roles that 
international interveners can play in these transformations, it is crucial to understand, 
 *  Professor of Law University of Minnesota Law School and Transitional Justice Institute University of 
Ulster and Professor of Law New England Law School. Professor Ní Aoláin acknowledges the support of the 
British Academy in enabling the completion of this research. 
 1  Ralph Wilde,  International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never 
Went Away (Oxford University Press 2008). 
 2  “Con" ict can provide women with opportunities to break out of stereotypes and sti" ing societal 
patterns [. . .] If women seize these opportunities, transformation is possible. ! e challenge is to protect the 
seeds of transformation sown during the upheaval and to use them to grow the transformation in the tran-
sitional period of reconstruction.” UN Women, “Progress of the World’s Women (2011–2012): In Pursuit of 
Justice” (Report, UN Women 2011) 81 (quoting Anu Pillay). 
 3  Vasuki Nesiah, “Feminism as Counter-Terrorism: ! e Seduction of Power” in Margaret L. Satterthwaite 
and Jayne C. Kirby (eds),  Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives 
(Routeledge 2013) 133. 
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support and reframe post-con" ict reconstruction processes for women. If  jus post bel-
lum constitutes, in part, an extension of the just war theory which looks to both “the 
justness of the war and the justness of the way that war was fought,” 4 a key question for 
feminist scholars is how and where do women - t in the antecedent and constituting 
doctrines? If for some,  jus post requires a peace that is an improvement on the situation 
prior (to war), or creates some obligations for the parties to a con" ict when a state is con-
quered or defeated, how might such obligations translate into practical e% ect for women? 
Our initial response is skepticism that another normative framework can substantively 
change the legal or political calculus for women, and fear that it may merely clutter the 
legal landscape, with the overall outcome of less rather than more legal enforcement for 
women. Our skepticism is also connected to unearthing the genealogy of the  jus ad and 
 jus in traditions, with their consistent lack of attention to gender as a relevant category of 
analysis or in disaggregating the modalities and costs of war to women. 
 ! is chapter will explore the utility of a  jus post bellum conceptual framework in 
tackling gender issues in post-con" ict transitions. Part I confronts the question of 
legitimacy—addressing the complexity of utilizing the post-con" ict moment to advance 
the interests of women. Part II addresses the relationship between post-con" ict recon-
struction, gender justice, and a  jus post framework of analysis. We speci- cally assess the 
practices of post-con" ict reconstruction where some considerable gender mainstream-
ing e% orts have been made by states and international institutions, speculating whether 
such form and substance can or should be gra# ed onto the  jus post approach. Part III is 
concerned with teasing out what patriarchal baggage resides in the  jus post placeholder, 
and identifying the gender blind spots of this emerging discourse. We address what 
“work” the concept is doing as identi- ed by scholars and policy-makers, and whether the 
framework attends to the range and forms of issues that have been identi- ed as “of con-
cern to women” in the a# ermath of armed con" ict. Part IV imagines what  jus post might 
add to this work. In conclusion, the chapter adopts a questioning stance on the extent to 
which a juridical framework comprised of a deep reach into a law of war framework that 
remain deeply exclusionary for women and whether mindfulness of gender during war’s 
activation, regulation, and closure can mitigate those limitations or transcend them. We 
are not so naive as to suppose that any legal framework provides a silver bullet solu-
tion to regulating women’s lives during and a# er con" ict, but we recognize the “need 
to examine the distributive and ideological implications of di% erent legal architectures.” 5 
 II.  Utilizing the Post-Con! ict Temporal Period to 
Advance Women’s Interests and Positioning 
 At the outset, we must acknowledge a certain wariness in attempting to apply an 
under-de- ned concept  jus post bellum to the issues with which we are concerned. 6 
Justice for women in general, what “justice” means for and to women, and the extent 
to which the gendered nature of con" ict, and the programs and policies undertaken 
 4  Gary J. Bass, “Jus Post Bellum” (2004) 32  Philosophy and Public A" airs  384. 
 5  Nesiah, “Feminism as Counter-Terrorism” (n. 3) 140. 
 6  We note that a number of feminist scholars working in other disciplines have sought to engage with 
the relationship between feminist and just war theorizing. See e.g. Laura Sjoberg, “Why Just War Needs 
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in its a# ermath, may necessitate di% erent solutions and outcomes for women than for 
the “gender neutral” citizen commonly employed as a the post-con" ict Everyman. As 
scholars have unequivocally a1  rmed, the idea of justice can be spelled out in many 
di% erent ways, and such distinctions have important consequences in post-con" ict 
societies. 7 
 In post-con" ict settings the justice in play can be alternatively retributive, restitutive, 
and compensatory, sometimes with all three combinations working in tandem. A gender 
perspective asks how, precisely, the distributive weight of justice in any of its forms 
is allocated. With a focus on transition, Bell and O’Rourke have aptly captured that 
there is much in particular to be gained from an emphasis on distributive justice for 
women—a facet frequently overlooked by feminist scholars and post-con" ict theorists 
alike. 8 For that reason, our analysis pays particular attention to the presence or absence 
of distributive justice in any  jus post conceptualization. In general, we start from the 
premise that close attention to gendered justice is critical to any evaluation of what  jus 
post bellum brings for women. 
 A.  Legitimacy 
 We acknowledge that our own primary premise—that the post-con" ict moment is 
generally an apt one for examining and potentially improving women’s status and daily 
lives—is not without critics or complexity. 9 First, the international presence within, 
and concomitant institutional validation of, the post-con" ict arena may mean that the 
will to reform and transform serves to displace wide-ranging questions that would oth-
erwise be asked about the morality of armed con" ict itself. 10 ! ere are a variety of 
feminist perspectives on the morality of war, 11 but it remains true that the “popular 
conception and actual practice alike align women with peace and paci- sm.” 12 Feminist 
scholars have pithily noted in other post-war regulatory contexts that the trade-o%  on 
protection in con" ict and inclusion in peace may well involve a deeper disengagement 
from the capacity to critique the engagement in armed con" ict itself. 13 ! e post-con" ict 
setting is one where the impulse to remedy the excesses of war by way of accountability, 
Feminism Now More than Ever” (2008) 45  International Politics 1; Marian Eide, “ ‘! e Stigma of Nation’ 
Feminist Just War, Privilege and Responsibility” (2008) 23  Hypatia  48. 
 7  Jon Elster, “Justice, Truth, Power” in Rosemary Nagy, Jon Elster, and Melissa S. Williams,  Transitional 
Justice (NYU Press 2012) 78. 
 8  Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, “Does Feminism Need a ! eory of Transitional Justice?” 
(2007) 1  International Journal of Transitional Justice  23–44. 
 9  See e.g. Karen Engle, “ ‘Calling in the Troops’: ! e Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention” (2007) 20  Harvard Human Rights Journal 189; Janet 
Halley, “Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive 
International Criminal Law” (2009) 30  Michigan Journal of International Law  1. 
 10  Lucinda J. Peach, “An Alternative to Paci- sm? Feminism and Just War ! eory” (1994) 9  Hypatia 
152, 153. 
 11  See e.g. Jean Bethke Elshtain,  Women and War (University of Chicago Press 1987); Sara Ruddick 
“Pacifying the Forces: Dra# ing Women in the Interests of Peace” (1983) 8  Signs  471. 
 12  Peach, “An Alternative to Paci- sm?” (n. 10) 153. 
 13  Diane Otto, “! e Exile of Inclusion: Re" ections on Gender Issues in International Law over the Last 
Decade” (2009) 10  Melbourne Journal of International Law  11. 
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reform, reparation, and mediation should not obscure the dilemma of validating the 
forces, institutions, and individuals that have been causal to the creation of communal 
violence. Articulating this paradox for the advancement of women’s interests in the 
post-con" ict moment underscores a broader tension in the relationship between  jus ad 
and  jus post bellum . 14 
 Second, there is certainly a range of complexities in post-con" ict sites, but some 
of them portend more risk for women. For example, ending con" ict o# en includes 
emerging mediated relationships between domestic elites; these can involve domi-
nance, recalibration and perceived increases in or loss of status and political power 
for women and for minorities. In commenting on nascent e% orts by the international 
community to engineer post-con" ict processes aimed toward improving women’s 
lives, we are mindful of the hazards that abound, when, for example, interveners insert 
themselves into the role of “savior” while essentializing some locals caught in con" ict—
particularly women—as “victims.” 15 
 A parallel, and third critique pinpoints the western imperialism implicit in the 
wide-ranging enterprise of post-con" ict reconstruction. 16 It identi- es the reproduction of 
colonial dialogues in cajoling the local population to move forward in de- ned ways, the 
emphasis on technocratic nation building, and the reproduction of social and political 
orders without reference to place, population, or local preferences. 17 Michael Ignatie% ’s 
celebration of nation building initiatives, for example, described as a “global hegemony 
whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy,” 18 can also be under-
stood as humanitarian empire building where the bene- ts and burdens are invariably 
distributed inequitably. We argue that those who control and shape these post-con" ict 
processes are typically male and invariably elite local, state, non-state, and interna-
tional institutional actors. In recent past practice, they have o# en systematically erased 
women as meaningful participants and agents from the post-con" ict terrain. 
 Fourth, when international actors become aware of women’s e% orts to be included in 
con" ict ending processes and acknowledge their obligations to assist with that inclusion, 19 
there is evidence of a pattern that shunts women into so#  roles as participants within civil 
 14  Citing George W. Bush on the reconstruction of Germany and Japan a# er the Second World War, 
“A# er defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we le#  behind constitutions and parlia-
ments.” Bass, “Jus Post Bellum” (n. 4) 385. 
 15  Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: ! e Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42  Harvard 
International Law Journal 201. A ri%  on that note has framed the military intervention of western states as 
premised on “saving” local women from local misogynistic men, reproducing age old vocabularies of “sav-
ing brown women from brown men.” 
 16  David Chandler,  Bosnia: Faking Democracy A# er Dayton (Pluto Press 1999). 
 17  Dina Francesca Haynes, “! e Deus ex Machina Descends: ! e Laws, Priorities and Players Central 
to the International Administration of Post-Con" ict Bosnia and Herzegovina” in Dina Francesca 
Haynes (ed.),  Deconstructing the Reconstruction (Ashgate 2008). For more on critiques of heavy-handed 
post-con" ict interventions, see also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Naomi Cahn,  On 
the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Con$ ict Process (Oxford University Press 2011) ( On the Frontlines ) 
intro and ch. 4. 
 18  Michael Ignatie% , “! e American Empire:  ! e Burden”  New  York Time Magazine (New  York, 5 
January 2003). 
 19  Resolution 1325 mandates a set of inclusion requirements for states and other international actors. 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Res. 1325, Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (2000), UN Doc. S/
RES/1325 (31 October 2000). 
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society movements rather than at the negotiation table itself. 20 While recent e% orts to 
include women in post-con" ict negotiation processes have succeeded in increasing the 
number of women present, there is still marginalization of these women, who have 
undertaken sometimes extraordinary e% orts to become visible to the decision-makers 
in the transitional process. 21 
 Like Vatanparast writing in this volume, we are concerned that  jus post bellum fram-
ing allows for manipulation by elite actors and norm entrepreneurs, in tandem with 
embedding and legitimating neo-colonial projects through law. We assert, nonetheless, 
that it is critical to harness the potential to create opportunities and capture improvements 
for women that might otherwise never exist. In this e% ort, one might characterize our 
approach as deeply pragmatic. While all interventionist approaches have obvious draw-
backs (lacking, for example, legitimacy and longevity unless there is local ownership 
and “buy in”), 22 not intervening at all, doing so too so# ly, or placing “women’s issues” 
too far down on the agenda of intervention and post-con" ict priorities also bears sig-
ni- cant risk. Inaction during transition can leave women at a loss for substantial rights 
protection at a time when the rights of individuals are most likely to be considered and 
formulated or reformulated. 23 
 If a  jus post bellum framework is one that optimizes and makes clearer the legal and 
political frames that apply in post-con" ict settings, an important dimension of its util-
ity to women would be the extent to which any such consolidation recognizes how 
con" ict a% ects men and women di% erently, and prioritizes equality gains for women. 
Similarly, if the goal of a  jus post bellum framework is coherency and completeness of 
the post-con" ict reconstruction terrain, then an obvious set of questions arises as to 
the comparative bene- ts of coherency versus fragmentary legal systems. As one of the 
authors has asked elsewhere, “do the presumed bene- ts of a unitary, cohesive system 
of international law really accrue to women? When fragmentation occurs and legal 
regimes multiply do women bene- t? If so, how?” 24 Feminists and those interested in 
gender in post-con" ict would do well to pause and re" ect on the state of the  jus post 
bellum - eld, 25 and consider: How best to proceed? How can feminists avoid the con-
stant di1  culty of catching up while an emerging - eld expands? How could a feminist 
vision of  jus post bellum be framed that is not only responsive to expansion and oppor-
tunity but could actually frame the basis of engagement on its own terms? How would a 
 20  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 10; Dina Haynes, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 
and Naomi Cahn, “Women in the Post-con" ict Process: Reviewing the Impact of Recent UN Actions in 
Achieving Gender Centrality” (2012) 11  Santa Clara Law Review  101. 
 21  See Johanna E. Bond, “Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa” (2010) 83  Southern California 
Law Review 509 (2010). 
 22  See also Haynes, “! e Deus ex Machina Descends” (n. 17) 13 (discussing “governance by - at”). 
 23  See e.g. ! eodora-Ismene Gizelis, “A Country of ! eir Own:  Women and Peacebuildin g ” (2011) 
28  Con$ ict Management and Peace Science 522, 524 (“UN operations can do better to ensure successful 
long-term peace than purely domestic alternatives and international involvement without the UN”). 
 24  Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “International Law, Gender Regimes and Fragmentation:  1325 and Beyond” 
in Cecilia M.  Bailliet (ed.),  Non State Actors, So#  Law and Protective Regimes (Cambridge University 
Press 2012). 
 25  On the “state of the - eld” in transitional justice discourses, see generally Christine Bell, “Transitional 
Justice, Interdisciplinarity, and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’ ” (2009) 3  International Journal of 
Transitional Justice  5. 
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feminist vision incorporate non-hegemonic practices and be aware of the complexities 
and contradictions of its own dominant discourses? 
 B.  Post-con! ict reconstruction: language and motif 
 If one aspect of the  jus ad bellum motif is an extension of justness into the post-con" ict 
phase, 26 the quality and outcomes of post-con" ict re-construction then falls squarely 
into a  jus post bellum framework. Post-con" ict reconstruction can be said to describe 
the collection of programs created and administered by various international organi-
zations and their local partners in the period immediately following the formal legal 
conclusion of armed con" ict. ! ere is frequently, but not inevitably, an overlap with the 
application of local and international transitional justice mechanisms and processes 
in play. In trying to understand how  jus post di% ers or compares to post-con" ict 
reconstruction, we can look to Larry May’s concept of  jus post , which focuses on the 
“rebuilding” of a state. 27 From a methodological point of view, we start with some 
linguistic parsing. ! e idea of “ re ” building presumes a putting back together of that 
which is broken or destroyed, as does “ re ” construction. It is di1  cult to argue with 
the urgent necessity to bring order and structure back to societies whose physical and 
social infrastructure has been destroyed by communal violence. Yet, the comforting 
implication of the terminology presumes a going to back to things as they were before, 
and this is where “post-con" ict reconstruction” frequently falls short. First, the call 
to reconstruct the pre-con" ict order can be a slippery slope for women, 28 risking a 
return to status quo ante. Presumptions of the status quo ante also are largely played 
out on realist terms as a politics of power, security, and order. 29 ! is approach has con-
sistently ignored what Porter has termed a “politics of compassion,” in which there is 
attentiveness to the needs of vulnerable persons who have experienced su% ering, an 
active listening to the voices of the vulnerable and open, compassionate and appropriate 
responses to particular needs. 30 
 And yet, much of post-con" ict work is deaf to determining what women and other 
vulnerable persons who have su% ered want in terms of the post-con" ict justice devised 
and meted out for them by local and international elites. For example, in a study under-
taken in the eastern Congo, more than 2,600 people (half of whom were women) stated 
that their highest individual priorities were peace, security, and livelihood concerns 
(money, education, food, and health). 31 Transitional justice, which has been historically 
 26  Note, for example, the language of Former President Jimmy Carter in response to the war in Iraq 
emphasizing the relationship between the just war tradition and post-war responsibilities: “! e peace it 
establishes must be a clear improvement over what exists.” Jimmy Carter, “Just War—or Just a War?”  % e 
New York Times (New York, 9 March 2003) 13. 
 27  Larry May,  A# er War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2012) ch. 1 (de- n-
ing the terrain as “governing practices a# er war ends”). 
 28  But see Ana Maria Munoz Boudet, Patti Petesch, and Carolyn Turk, “On Norms and Agency 
Conversations about Gender Equality with Women and Men in 20 Countries” (Report, World Bank 2012). 
 29  Elizabeth Porter, “Can Politics Practice Compassion” (2006) 21  Hypatia  97. 
 30  Porter, “Can Politics Practice Compassion” (n. 29) 97. 
 31  Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, “Ownership and Participation in Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms: A Sustainable Human Development Perspective from Eastern DRC” (2008) 2  International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 398, 399. 
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premised on achieving accountability and underpinned by the notion of “punishing 
those responsible” was ranked as  the eighteenth priority. ! e authors of the study con-
cluded that “transitional justice must be integrated within a broader social, political, 
and economic transition to provide for basic needs and protection.” 32 A similar sur-
vey in Uganda, conducted shortly a# er a peace agreement was signed there, found 
that survey participants’ highest priorities were health (45 percent), peace, education, 
and livelihood issues (food and land), with seeking justice, at a mere three percent, as 
a much lower priority. 33 Indeed, when asked to consider what should be done for the 
victims of wartime violence, 51.8 percent of the respondents said that victims should 
be given - nancial compensation and 8.2 percent said victims should be given cattle 
and goats (for a total of 60 percent of - nancial or material compensation), with only 
1.7 percent indicating that victims should be given “justice.” 34 When women in refu-
gee camps in Darfur, who had previously experienced sexual violence, were asked what 
they needed to move forward, they replied “food security.” 35 
 Empirically it seems that a substantial percentage of women deem (when asked), 
that justice in post-con" ict contexts includes not just criminal and civil accountabil-
ity (rights-based justice) but also assistance of the kind traditionally associated with 
development aid. ! is assistance, which falls somewhere between the mandates of 
those engaged in humanitarian aid and development, and which elsewhere we have 
described as “social services justice,” 36 is received more in the form of “healing” jus-
tice, because it focuses on providing critical social services to facilitate all aspects of 
post-con" ict reconstruction. 
 As our work and that of other scholars has noted, con" icts sometimes produce 
surprising results for women. ! ey are paradoxically contexts in which the social " ux 
of violence provides access to public space, working opportunities, augmented political 
responsibilities, social activism, and greater gender equality. 37 ! e rub may come at the 
end of con" ict, in the  jus post phase when women see the gains that they have made 
through a time of social " ux lost in the re-construction and re-building phase. Hence, 
we approach “re”-building with some gender-aware caution, and underscore our posi-
tion that the re-distributive elements of any gender justice analysis demands nuanced 
recognition that con" icts can produce some gendered resource equalization, which 
may be lost by crude post-con" ict liberal market driven “reforms.” 38 
 32  Vinck and Pham, “Ownership and Participation in Transitional Justice Mechanisms” (n. 31) 409. 
 33  Phuong Pham et al., “When War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, 
and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda” (Report, UC Berkeley Human Rights Center 2007) 3, 22. 
 34  Pham et al., “When War Ends” (n. 33) 35. 
 35  Physicians for Human Rights, “Nowhere to Turn: Failure to Protect, Support and Assure Justice for 
Darfuri Women” (Report, Physicians for Human Rights 2009) 2 < https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/
nowhere-to-turn.pdf > (accessed 22 July 2013). 
 36  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) 11. 
 37  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) chs 2, 5 and 10;  see also Georgina Waylen, 
 Engendering Transitions:  Women’s Mobilization, Institutions and Gender Outcomes (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 6–9; Marsha Greenberg and Elaine Zuckerman, “! e Gender Dimensions of Post-Con" ict 
Reconstruction:  Challenges in Development Aid” in Tony Addison and Tilman Bruck,  Making Peace 
Work: % e Challenges of Social and Economic Reconstruction 101 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 5. 
 38  See e.g. Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 10. It also underscores a broader ana-
lytical point by feminist scholar Danielle Poe that the failure of just war theory to account for the fullness of 
war’s costs has broader implications, not least that an ethic of di% erence ought to infuse our understanding 
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 Second, as a construct for improving women’s lives during and a# er the political, 
economic, and social transitions that o# en follow war, post-con" ict reconstruction 
has some evident weak points. For example, it is distinctly “emergency” focused. 39 
! e people who work in the organizations and agencies post-con" ict have o# en been 
present during the war and into the early days a# er formal cessation of hostilities. As 
a consequence, they are accustomed to operating in emergency mode, and so fail to 
adjust to longer-term strategizing and thinking even long a# er the emergency phases 
have passed. 40 As a result of this incessant focus on reacting, rather than planning, and 
reacting only to the next urgent issue risking security, women’s needs o# en - gure in mar-
ginal and highly stereotyped ways. Most o# en this manifests as a sole focus on physical 
protection of women, and even then, as we have argued elsewhere, not o# en well done. 41 
! is sort of stylized approach fails to take account of “an ethics of sexual di% erence” in the 
post-war moment and its implications for the ordering of post-con" ict settings. 42 ! ird, 
the outlines for most post-con" ict programs are negotiated during peace talks where 
women have historically had scant representation. 43 Fourth, the programs de- ned 
during the peace accords, and re- ned by the international organizations carrying them 
out, typically focus heavily on civil and political rights, which may not align with women’s 
priorities for post-con" ict gains, and may result in skewed distributional e% ects, with 
perceptible gender e% ects. 44 
 Ben-Porath, among others, has argued cogently that an ethics of care and depend-
ence, if fused into the post-war arena, would fundamentally realign our understanding 
and re-prioritization of  jus post bellum . 45 In this thinking, post-war deliberations 
should include relational considerations and the interconnectedness of responsi-
bilities to address the consequences of armed con" ict. Such theorization seeks to 
mitigate the perceived harms of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and inter-
national administration, and to fundamentally realign how we conceive substantively 
and procedurally of post-war reconstruction. 46 But it remains unclear how, if at all, a 
 jus post bellum analysis shi# s some of the identi- ed challenges and avoids the stated 
pitfalls. Moreover, we remain unconvinced that the post-con" ict terrain requires a 
new conceptual placeholder of  jus post bellum to do the work, rather than to address 
these issues of substance and process in their distinct and di% erent legal and political 
- elds. 
of just war theory with implications for post-war settlements. See Danielle Poe, “Replacing Just War ! eory 
with an Ethics of Sexual Di% erence” (2008) 23  Hypatia 33, 45–6. 
 39  Diane Otto, “Remapping Crisis ! rough a Feminist Lens” in Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson (eds),  Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance? (Hart 2011) 75. 
 40  Haynes, “Deus ex Machina” (n. 17). 
 41  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn, “Women in the Post-con" ict Process” (n. 20). 
 42  Poe, “Replacing Just War ! eory” (n. 38) 45–6. 
 43  Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, “! e Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and 
! eir Agreements” (2010) 59  International and Comparative Law Quarterly  1. 
 44  See Zinaida Miller, “E% ects of Indivisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice” (2008) 
2  International Journal of Transitional Justice  266. 
 45  Sigal Ben-Porath, “Care Ethics and Dependence—Rethinking Jus Post Bellum” (2008) 23  Hypatia  61. 
 46  ! e analysis draws heavily on Joan Tronto’s work arguing for instituting an ethics of care and recon-
structing the political system to re" ect an anti-elitist, participatory claim for ending dependency. See Joan 
C. Tronto,  Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge 1993). 
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 C.  Gender centrality 
 Having introduced the notion that con" ict a% ects both men and women, but sometimes 
di% erently, we want to a1  rm the importance of a gender lens focused on post-con" ict 
processes, because the value of a gendered assessment remains contested. In the legal 
and political space of ending or transmuting con" ict, women still struggle to assert 
the magnitude of issues that a% ect them directly. ! ey remain subordinated by domi-
nant discourses that minimize or ignore the value of placing the needs and views of 
women at the center of the conversation about ending violent communal behaviors, 
even though such placement is absolutely central to ending societal violence. 47 It needs 
constant restatement that women are the group most historically marginalized and 
excluded from the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes across all jurisdictions 
and con" icts. 
 ! ere are well-acknowledged gender gaps in existing legal frameworks applicable 
to post-con" ict settings, including the law of armed con" ict, international criminal 
law, and international human rights law. In all these sites, signi- cant but incomplete 
conceptual and practical work has been undertaken (and remains ongoing) to address 
de- cits, incentivize compliance, and shore-up enforcement. 48 It is insu1  cient, but it is 
a start. Given the relative youth of such e% orts, we underscore our skepticism that such 
a variety of legal and political responses can be fully embedded and resolved in emerg-
ing  jus post bellum discourses, or that there has been a substantial commitment by the 
norm entrepreneurs in the - eld to frame them with an embedded sense of gender justice. 
 We assert, instead, that applying a gender lens to con" ict and its a# ermath, regard-
less of the doctrine employed, helps us recognize that understanding women’s needs 
must become central to con" ict resolution, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and recon-
ciliation e% orts. As we have argued elsewhere, 49 merely integrating gender practices 
into post-con" ict process already underway is insu1  cient unless gender is incorpo-
rated into all aspects and levels of the newly developing or rehabilitating state. It is also 
insu1  cient to rely solely on formal legal norms alone, be they  jus post driven or any 
other, to confront the gender inequalities, violence, and discrimination that women 
may have experienced during con" ict, or for women to be given a place merely within 
civil society post-con" ict institutions. Law alone cannot do the work. 
 Rather, a broadly framed set of imperatives is required which includes, but does 
not rely solely on, legal reform to address harm and exclusion. For example, where 
women have predominantly come into view in recent post-con" ict legal arenas it has 
been as an instrumental means to hold war crimes perpetrators accountable for sexual 
violence. 50 While not undermining per se the credibility and value of such account-
ability mechanisms, it should be clear that this slice of woman-centered concern limits 
 47  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 2. 
 48  See e.g. Lara Stemple, “Human Rights, Sex, and Gender: Limits in ! eory and Practice” (2011) 31  Pace 
Law Review 824; Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds),  International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches 
(Hart 2005); Christine Chinkin, “Feminist Interventions into International Law” (1997) 19  Adelaide Law 
Review 13; Haynes et al., “Women in the Post-con" ict Process” (n. 20). 
 49  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17). 
 50  Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)contents Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
(2005) 99  American Journal of International Law  778. 
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what we understand about the gendered dynamics of any con" ict and its post-con" ict 
processes and laws. Moreover, we cannot hope to dislodge practices of violence towards 
women (before, during, and a# er con" ict) unless we are prepared to confront a broader 
array of socially embedded violence. 
 III.  What Work Does  Jus Post Bellum 
Do in Post-Con! ict Settings? 
 Jus post bellum can be regarded as a reasonably new conceptual placeholder containing 
the idea that there is an emerging and coherent body of legal norms applicable to the 
post-con" ict arena. 51 In addressing the notion of an existing and consistent notion 
of “justice” in the post-con" ict showground—we must - rst generally ascertain what 
norms we have now, how e% ective they are, and what augmentation, if any, is required. 52 
In this vein, we pay particular attention to the danger that  jus post bellum “is not a 
properly universal [concept] as its development has privileged the experiences of men 
over those of women.” 53 In this context, we draw on a substantial strain of feminist 
analysis directed at critique and reformulation of both  jus ad bellum and  jus in bello 
frameworks. 54 Second, we are acutely aware of a substantial literature that con- rms the 
search for universal, abstract, and hierarchical standards as associated with and driven 
by masculine modes of reasoning, with distinct application to universalist and absolut-
ist legal frameworks in international law. 55 ! ere is an acute hazard, then, that  jus post 
bellum also bestows privilege to a set of norms that capture what is important to men 
about justice in post-con" ict settings, but may not equally address what is important to 
women. Finally, re" ecting on the gendered dimensions of any  post bellum framework, 
some obvious methodological questions arise. 56 ! ey include questioning whether 
gender analysis emerges in response to an existing set of generally agreed norms, which 
means that the discourse presumes its own gender neutrality, but also, because it is 
established, that gender consciousness is to be integrated from the outside in. 
 51  May,  A# er War Ends (n. 27). Some early glimpses of a  jus post analysis are found in Michael Walzer,  Just 
and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic Books 1992) 123. 
 52  ! ere has been little if any analysis addressing what a feminist  jus in bello might look like. ! e closest 
perhaps is the work of feminist international relations security scholars such as Laura Sjoberg’s language of 
“empathetic war-- ghting” to describe the foregrounding of individual responsibility with the impact of war. 
Laura Sjoberg, “! e Paradox of Double E% ect: How Feminism Can Save the Immunity Principle” (2006) 
 Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights Working Paper  31. 
 53  See Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, “! e Gender of  Jus Cogens ” (1993) 15  Human Rights 
Quarterly 63, 65. 
 54  See, inter alia, Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet, “A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket” (2011) 13 
 International Feminist Journal of Politics 163; Eide, “ ‘! e Stigma of Nation’ ” (n. 6). 
 55  Eide, “ ‘! e Stigma of Nation’ ” (n. 6) 56, drawing on Carol Gilligan,  In a Di" erent Voice: Psychological 
% eory and Women’s Development (Harvard University Press 1982) 
 56  Feminist scholars have frequently paused to re" ect on the “gender” of international law doctrines and 
to wonder at the “structure of concept detailed by international law scholars.” ! is article follows that line 
of inquiry. See Charlesworth and Chinkin, “! e Gender of Jus Cogens” (n. 53); in the context of the doc-
trine of self-determination, feminist scholars have noted how, for example, “the oppression of women has 
never been considered relevant to the validity of [a group’s] claim or to the form self-determination should 
take.” Christine Chinkin, “A Gendered perspective to the Use of Force in International Law” (1992) 12 
 Australian Yearbook of International Law 279 (1992); Charlesworth and Chinkin, “! e Gender of Jus 
Cogens” (n. 53) 73. 
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 It has been argued, for example, that “[o] ne important di% erence between  jus ad 
bellum and  jus in bello on the one hand, and  jus post bellum on the other, is that the 
law is fairly settled as to the prior two categories.” 57 ! is position has some derivative 
consequences, and the presumption of settled law comes with some substantial gender 
baggage. First, women’s interests have fared notoriously badly in the regulation of vio-
lent con" icts between states. Armed confrontation between states has generally been 
carried out by male combatants (with exceptions, as we acknowledge). ! e applica-
ble laws of war were also generally constructed from the vista of the soldier’s need for 
ordered rules within which to wage war on behalf of the state. Historically the focus lay 
in de- ning the - elds of action for the soldier (including exclusions of acts and targets) 
rather than on recognizing harms with consequent liabilities caused by state actors 
during con" ict. All this in turn meant that until relatively recently, the locales and 
personalities of injury towards women in situations of con" ict were places where neither 
law nor recorded narrative entered. 
 Second, the lack of harm elaboration means any presumption that  jus ad bellum 
and  jus in bello adequately address the violence lawfully permitted in war starts from 
a gendered blind spot. Logically, if the legal terrain of  jus post bellum follows from the 
frameworks of  jus ad bellum and  jus in bello , then one must, from a gendered perspective, 
account for the gendered limitations of the derivative frameworks. ! e degree of gender 
exclusion, blind spots, and omissions will invariably a% ect how one quanti- es the value 
of the  jus post bellum discourse to addressing the gendered dimensions of armed con" ict 
and its a# ermath. 
 Our primary concern is that  jus post bellum discourse has emerged, as did its 
predecessor frameworks, without conscious attention being paid to gender as a consti-
tutive dimension of post-con" ict arenas, institutions and activities. Hence, if it is to add 
anything to the post-con" ict terrain for women, it must start by paying analytical atten-
tion to the degree (if any) of gender consciousness and gender sensitivity in articulation 
of relevant and cohering norms. Larry May asks who is the intended person addressed 
by  jus post bellum principles? 58 His attention is directed to the “average citizen,” who 
has little say in how wars are mounted or in the morality of a state’s conduct. But there 
is no such thing as the “average citizen,” and he certainly does not represent women. 
We suggest that close attention to the sex and the intersectionalities that accompany 
the citizen subject make a profound di% erence to determining the views of this “average 
citizen,” for whom post-con" ict laws and constitutions are written and institutions are 
built, both in respect of the conduct of war and its a# ermath. 
 ! ere is more to be said here, but the short form of what we would propose starts 
from the premise that the building blocks of  jus post require a  jus ad and a  jus in —this 
is not per se controversial and is generally presumed by liberal approaches to  jus post 59 
discourse. However, if we interrogate the solidity of the building blocks constituting 
 57  Kristen Boon, “ Jus Post Bellum in the Age of Terrorism: Introductory Remarks” (2012) 106  Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)  331. 
 58  May,  A# er War Ends (n. 27) 5 
 59  Foremost among these is Walzer,  Just and Unjust Wars (n. 51). While Walzer does not address  jus post 
bellum directly, he clearly a1  rms that there is justice in the goals of war, from which follows the presump-
tion that the post-con" ict execution of these goals weigh in any judgment of the war’s overall justice. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Oct 25 2013, NEWGEN
10_9780199685899_Stahn_c09.indd   171 10/25/2013   9:12:46 AM
172 Compatibility of Justice for Women with Jus Post Bellum Analysis
these two frameworks from a gender perspective, namely the extent to which either 
body of norms takes account of gendered roles, relationships and structures and the 
consequent harms that may befall both women and men in situations of armed con-
" ict on account of gender, then some foundational shakiness is evident. A number of 
choices follow. ! e - rst is to recognize the genealogical de- ciencies and to construct 
 jus post bellum as a transformative framework that fully integrates gender analysis and 
speci- city into its norm creation and consolidation. We do not here attempt to advance 
such gender integration into  jus post bellum , but instead acknowledge that attempts 
have been made by feminist political theorists to develop a gendered conceptualization 
of the doctrine to varied success. 60 
 ! e direction of much of the existing theory work is to locate an alternative vision 
of  jus post in a feminist ethic of care, compassion, and relational dependency. Leaving 
aside the signi- cant challenges of essentialism in a feminist ethic of care approach, our 
goal here is not to translate the corpus of legally based post-con" ict capacity building 
through the prism of relational autonomy and care, 61 though our views on social 
services justice, articulated elsewhere 62 and noted above, could be viewed as one instru-
mentalization of this approach. 
 ! e second choice is to work within the status quo, with its inherent limitations, 
but to utilize the tools that have emerged to integrate a gendered analysis (the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions, international criminal law, gendered program-
ming and development awareness), 63 and attempt to move forward, integrating those 
tools into the existing framework. As we have argued elsewhere, 64 the international 
community has not yet successfully addressed women and gender in its humanitarian 
interventions or its post war operations. Nevertheless, as we have also elsewhere articu-
lated, 65 there is some momentum being created that indicates that gender is squarely 
on the agenda of these actors. We believe that putting some pressure on the reformist 
impulses currently underway, set forth in the next section, is preferable to beginning 
anew, unless the “new” framework promises to centralize gender into its essence, and 
ful- lls that promise through implementation. 
 IV.  Current International Legal Responses to the Gender 
Dimensions of Con! ict and Post-Con! ict Processes 
 In the past 30 years, the international institutional infrastructure (comprised largely 
of the UN and other international agencies and donors) has sought to respond to 
intra-state, and, more frequently, inter-state, con" ict through interventions designed to 
secure peace and advance related goals, including regional security, economic stability, 
and the recognition of human rights for all individuals. ! e process of “securing” peace 
 60  See, Sjoberg “Paradox of Double E% ect” (n. 52); Eide, “ ‘! e Stigma of Nation’ ” (n. 6); Ben-Porath, 
“Care Ethics and Dependence” (n. 45). 
 61  On relational feminist theory, see Robin West,  Caring for Justice (NYU Press 1999). 
 62  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 11. 
 63  Haynes et al., “Women in the Post-con" ict Process” (n. 20). 
 64  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17) 17. 
 65  Haynes et al., “Women in the Post-con" ict Process” (n. 20). 
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has no bright lines or demarcations, and so guaranteeing immediate peace o# en leads 
to a longer-term phase of stabilizing the country through post-con" ict reconstruction 
processes and development. Decisions about what is included in, or le#  out of,  post bellum 
processes are o# en made early during the peace negotiation phases. 66 
 Historically, the actors involved in responding to violent con" ict, securing peace, 
and reconstructing nations torn apart by con" ict have failed to take into account the 
experiences and relevant contribution to peacemaking that women may have. Recent 
combined legal and political e% orts on multiple fronts, including treaty recognition 
of gender-based violence, 67 robust jurisprudence from regional human rights treaties, 
and embedded policy initiatives through UN agencies (some newly created to address 
these issues), 68 have given rise to a larger discussion about the impact of con" ict on 
women as a distinct group. Over the past half century, international actors, includ-
ing and sometimes led by UN agencies speci- cally tasked with assessing the condition 
and status of women, began recognizing that women were excluded from many of the 
processes devised to end con" ict and secure peace, and that their inclusion was desir-
able towards the UN objective of peace and security. In some sense therefore, without 
ignoring the pitfalls of international con" ict feminism as a “player in global power 
politics,” 69 there are concrete and identi- able gains to be had for women. Including the 
presence of women in meaningful ways and securing their visibility in the transitional 
justice and post-con" ict reconstruction frameworks that have emerged in recent 
decades creates a chance of concretely improving the post-con" ict lives of women. 
 In particular, one relatively recent change is the UN Security Council’s passage of 
Resolution 1325, an initiative to “mainstream” women into post-con" ict processes. 70 
We can see various rationales for the adoption of SCR 1325, including: (1) consolida-
tion of the Security Council’s legitimacy (albeit via “so# ” law) a# er the peacekeeping 
debacles in both Rwanda and Bosnia/Herzegovina; 71 (2) the patriarchal political capital 
to be gained by action with respect to women’s rights a# er the same two human rights 
crises revealed systematic rape and sexual violence of women; and (3) a response to the 
concerted campaign by international women’s NGOs (the governance feminism shi#  
by the international feminist movement to gain UN Security Council access), insisting 
that the Security Council take a normative stand on women’s rights in the context of 
armed con" ict. 
 Over a period of 10 years, the Security Council adopted - ve more resolutions 
on women, peace, and security, aiming to “mainstream” women into all aspects of 
 66  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17). 
 67  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Res 
48/104, UN Doc. A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993). 
 68  UN Women was formed in 2010 as a super-agency dedicated to issues impacting women. In its - rst 
report, the agency listed as indicators of progress for women’s su% rage, recognized by only two countries 
in 1911 and now “virtually universal” (signifying political rights) and the signing of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by 186 countries (signifying attention to 
economic, social, and cultural rights); the report also noted, however, widespread economic and labor inse-
curity, bias in legal systems, gender-based violence, and insu1  cient health care as ongoing and pervasive 
gendered concerns. UN Women, “Progress of the World’s Women (2011–2012)” (n. 2) 8–9. 
 69  Nesiah, “Feminism as Counter-Terrorism” (n. 3) 125; See also Otto, “! e Exile of Inclusion” (n. 13). 
 70  UNSC Res. 1325 (n. 19).    71  See Otto, “! e Exile of Inclusion” (n. 13). 
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peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping operations. 72 On the plus side, the 
adoption of these Security Council Resolutions formally acknowledged and addressed, 
at least rhetorically, the need to incorporate women into processes intended to secure 
peace. Also, because the UN Security Council is recognized and understood as the key 
global actor in the security arena, an actor whose resolutions are both determinative 
and binding as legal, political, and normative pronouncements, it was a powerful sig-
nal that these dimensions of harm to women were to be taken seriously by states and 
international institutions. 
 While we hope that Resolution 1325 and its successor resolutions bear fruit, we are 
mindful that tackling a highly selected menu of “women’s issues,” (with a primary and 
excessive focus on sexual violence) allows states adopting the resolution to maintain a 
comfortable and familiar role—as patriarchal protectors of women. 73 Bearing in mind 
the multiple dimensions of justice at play in such contexts, it remains striking the 
distributive justice remains well o%  the menu of issues and solutions to the causes con-
ducive to the production of extreme violence against women in con" ict situations, even 
as international institutions profess greater engagement with the harms experienced by 
women in war. 
 Assuming that a particular set of issues perceived to most acutely a% ect women are at 
least formally on the international agenda now, we are as yet unclear what the  jus post 
bellum framework can do for women 
 V.  What  Jus Post Bellum Might Add 
 ! e answer to whether the  jus post bellum construct might add anything to the 
improvement of women’s lives in the a# ermath of war depends both on (a) what 
women want (e.g. how one would measure and implement the justice demanded by 
women when asked), and (b) whether the conceptual and practical framework o% ered 
by  jus post bellum o% ers new tools to address complex legal and political issues. 
 May suggests that there are six key principles of the  jus post bellum : reconciliation, 
retribution, rebuilding, restitution, reparations, and proportionality. 74 Other scholars 
have argued that  jus post bellum constitutes an umbrella concept that reaches to the 
law of peace, the law of occupation, the responsibility to protect, emergency law, tran-
sitional justice, and peacebuilding. 75 Each of these legal realms has an enormous reach 
in its own right, and several facets of these legal - elds remain under construction, or 
 72  UNSC Res. 1325 (n. 19) 2. 
 73  See also Otto, “! e Exile of Inclusion” (n. 13) (discussing additional factors for the adoption of SCR 
1325 at this particular time). See also Sjoberg and Peet, “A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket” (n. 
54) 176 discussing how “belligerents justify wars as necessary to protect ‘their women and children’ both as 
innocent people themselves and as a symbol of the purity of the nation and the state.” 
 74  May,  A# er War Ends (n. 27). 
 75  See e.g. Jennifer Easterday, “ Jus Post Bellum in the Age of Terrorism: Remarks by Jennifer Easterday” 
(2012) 106  Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 335 (arguing that 
“One of [ jus post bellum ’s] central goals is the establishment and maintenance of sustainable peace. ! e 
 jus post bellum framework o% ers a way of unifying and reconceptualizing overlaps in laws that apply in 
post-con" ict situations. It provides relational cohesion to its underlying laws and norms, and a basis for 
assigning responsibility for post-con" ict obligation”). 
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are challenged to remain relevant in the ever-changing terrain of armed con" ict itself. 76 
! ere remains dispute among scholars as to the “known” nature of  jus post bellum and 
the certainty of what its application means and requires. 77 
 We caution that women might be particularly wary of hanging any hopes on a norm 
“under construction,” not least because it remains unclear to what degree and extent 
the concerns and needs of women are addressed by a body of norms designed to 
“bring together” existing legal practices, irrespective of the identi- ed limitations of 
existing doctrines. ! ere has been little if any engagement by feminist legal scholars 
with the  jus post bellum arena, yet as noted throughout this article and articulated by 
us elsewhere, the post-con" ict arena is axiomatically relevant to women. 78 ! ere are 
collective interests at play in the a# ermath of con" ict for women that cut across juris-
dictions and contexts. Some of these interests might be addressed by the institution of 
laws or accountability mechanisms, but others require multiple tools and processes to 
be simultaneously in e% ect, for example: systemic or pre-con" ict physical and sexual 
violence; psychosocial and physical concerns impacting refugees and displaced per-
sons; humanitarian aid dependency; lack of access to social and economic goods on 
an equal basis; exclusion from political processes; and lower legal, social, and economic 
status. 79 
 A separate set of issue arises as to the identities and motives of the entrepreneurs 
advancing a theory and practice of  jus post bellum . 80 Does the gender of the norm 
entrepreneurs matter? If so, how should feminist analysis and knowledge practices be 
included as a new doctrine comes into play? Feminist scholars have revealed the 
masculinity of the international legal order, showing how it produces hierarchy, exclu-
sivity and reproduces public/private dichotomies that rarely work to women’s advantage. 
Hilary Charlesworth de# ly captured an almost entirely one-sided conversation between 
feminist international law scholars and the mainstream, in which feminist theorizing 
and insight “is an optional extra, a decorative frill on the edge of the discipline.” 81 ! ere 
is evident pessimism about the mainstream indi% erence to feminist interventions, and 
deepening unease that feminist scholarship will remain con- ned to backwater status 
no matter the legal doctrine employed, if women are not centralized into the creation 
and implementation of the relevant doctrine. 
 76  Boon, “ Jus Post Bellum in the Age of Terrorism” (n. 57) (arguing that  jus post bellum “ contains many 
norms and objectives that are not settled law, but are instead under construction”). For example, occupa-
tion law is challenged by what Adam Roberts has termed “transformative occupations.” Adam Roberts, 
“Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Law of War and Human Rights” (2006) 100  American 
Journal of International Law 580. ! e law of peace has experienced signi- cant evolution since the end of 
the Cold War. Christine Bell,  On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Paci& catoria (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
 77  Bass, “Jus Post Bellum” (n 4). 
 78  Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn,  On the Frontlines (n. 17). 
 79  Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Advancing Feminist Positioning in the Field of Transitional Justice” (2012) 6 
 International Journal of Transitional Justice  205. 
 80  See generally, Catherine Powell, “! e Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. ‘War on 
Terrorism’ ” (2004) 5  % eoretical Inquiries  47. 
 81  Hilary Charlesworth, “Talking to Ourselves: Feminist Scholarship in International Law ? ” in Sari Kovo 
and Zoe Peterson (eds),  Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and 
Compliance (Hart Publishing 2011) 17. 
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 As the train of  jus post bellum thinking departs from the station, the same kinds of 
dynamics appear to be in play. 82 ! is is not to say that feminist scholars merely cry foul 
when a new theory makes an appearance without reference to women or to women’s 
experiences. Rather, it is to say that critical engagement mandates that women are cen-
tral in the production of norms, underscoring that the social construction of gendered 
norms is well understood and continues to reproduce itself in new norm creation. ! e 
unconscious presumption that the gender neutral Everyman employed when working 
out a new doctrine will meet the needs of both men and women no longer su1  ces. 
 When we insist that women be central to the creation of a new doctrine, we also wish 
to underscore the imperative of considering gender as one of many intersectionalities.  Jus 
post bellum is a ripe - eld for intersectional analysis. Employing Larry May’s “six normative 
principles of  jus post bellum : rebuilding, restitution, reconciliation, restitution, and repa-
ration as well as proportionality,” 83 for example, one can adduce a set of speci- c sites 
in which the dimensions of sex, age, sexual orientation, class, religion, ethnic identity 
and multiple other identities come together to shape individual and collective mem-
ory, articulation, and placement in the post-con" ict site. Inevitably, identifying what 
women want and need in the post-con" ict context is a delicate business. Any gender 
analysis must be particularly attuned to the intersectionality of women’s experiences, 
not only conscious of their gender but also of their race, religion, family status, economic 
background, sexual orientation, and so forth. Despite this multiplicity of intersecting 
characteristics, women’s complex and highly di% erentiated roles have too o# en, when 
thought of at all, been collapsed by the social and political dynamics of armed con-
" ict. Accepting and accommodating a diverse range of roles for women in war and 
post-war facilitates a greater conceptual and practical understanding of the lived inter-
sectionalities of most women’s lives. An intersectional analysis integrated to any  jus 
post bellum framework would both complicate and deepen the subjects of action in the 
post-con" ict setting. 
 VI.  Conclusion 
 What is the right way to end a war? In a way that o% ers respite, and ideally improvement, 
in the lives of all of its citizens, not just some. For women, the transformation of a state 
from “con" icted” to “peaceful” risks being partial and exclusionary. ! e transition pro-
cess itself may operate to cloak women’s ongoing repression and inequality. Applying 
the gender lens is critical to ensuring the e% ectiveness of policies and practices involved 
in ending con" icts and ensuring that they do not recur. Without this attention, tradi-
tional gender dichotomies may be further entrenched and exacerbated during times of 
extreme violence and extended in the post-con" ict phase. 
 We re" ect on what a feminist vision of  jus post bellum would look like. A feminist 
positioning would give prominence to a range of harms identi- ed by those socially 
subjected to armed con" ict and its a# ermath. ! ese would include retaining or 
 82  Of course the inclusion of one paper in a collective devoted to identifying a feminist perspective may 
be seen to do some work in closing the gap. 
 83  May,  A# er War Ends (n. 27). 
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recapturing the agency of the subjects by including them in the process; advancing 
security from violence, discrimination, and oppression; promoting sexual health and 
reproductive freedom. It would also require a non-hierarchical vision of legal norms 
within the  jus post analysis—one that does not automatically place political and civil 
rights at a hierarchical advantage. Drawing on the previous work of Charlesworth and 
Chinkin, 84 we reiterate that a feminist rethink could also undo the public/private divi-
sion that has de- ned the identi- cation and harnessing of and accountability for harms 
that occur in situations of armed con" ict, but as yet we see no promise of a feminist 
rethink coming through adopting the  jus post bellum framework. 
 Concentrating more rigorously on understanding how women experience harm and 
the manner in which law can facilitate and compound extremities of social and personal 
experience is a starting point for a female-centered understanding of con" ict and the 
harms it causes to women. More concretely, we would look beyond harms to the body 
and think in broader terms. Only then can the full scope of harms experienced by 
women be adequately addressed by a post-con" ict vision that is transformative. 
 Perhaps it matters less what we call this work, or the doctrine and theory under 
which it is done. What matters most is answering the questions—is the post-con" ict 
moment one in which to attempt to improve women’s status, power, and daily lives? 
Are the existing hard and so#  laws and processes meeting those needs? We think all 
post-con" ict moments are moments in which women’s lives might be exponentially 
improved, because it is during this transitional moment—in which constitutions and 
laws are written and rewritten, in which economic projects are undertaken, in which 
labor markets are rede- ned, in which educational systems are built—that opportunities 
may open up for women. 
 84  Charlesworth and Chinkin, “! e Gender of Jus Cogens” (n. 53) 75. 
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